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Abstract: Whereas 19th century Belgium is 
traditionally framed as heavily dependent on 
France, this image ought to be nuanced for its 
political system. During what Pierre Rosanvallon 
named the transnational ‘proportional moment’ 
(1899-1914), the introduction of Proportional 
Representation in parliamentary elections 
generated a French interest in Belgium as the 
‘electoral laboratory of Europe’. Arguments 
raised in the French Chambre des Députés were 
similar to those used in Belgian Parliament. 
The present article addresses the structural 
differences between the electoral debate in 
both states. Whereas Belgian constitutional 
doctrine adapted smoothly to the introduction 
of proportionality (Oscar Orban/Paul Errera) 
and held a moderate position bordering on that 
of Hans Kelsen, French doctrine was divided 
between the Parisian Adhémar Esmein, who 
defended the majority system as the bedrock 
of republicanism, and provincial professors of 
constitutional law, who had corporatist ideas, 
or were in favour of judicial review (Joseph-
Barthélémy, Léon Duguit). 
Keywords: Constitutional Law. Electoral Law. 
Public Law. Belgian Legal History. French 
Legal History.
Resumo: Enquanto a Bélgica do século XIX é 
tradicionalmente enquadrada como dependente 
da França, essa imagem possui uma nuance 
diversa no que se refere ao seu sistema político. 
Durante o que Pierre Rosanvallon chamou de 
“momento proporcional” transnacional (1899-
1914), a introdução da representação proporcional 
nas eleições parlamentares gerou um interesse 
francês na Bélgica como o “laboratório eleitoral 
da Europa”. Os argumentos levantados na Câmara 
dos Deputados francesa foram semelhantes aos 
usados  no Parlamento belga. O presente artigo 
aborda as diferenças estruturais entre o debate 
eleitoral nos dois Estados. Enquanto a doutrina 
constitucional belga se adaptou suavemente à 
introdução da proporcionalidade (Oscar Orban/
Paul Errera) e manteve uma posição moderada 
próxima à posição de Hans Kelsen, a doutrina 
francesa foi dividida entre o parisiense Adhémar 
Esmein, que defendia o sistema majoritário 
como a base do republicanismo, e os professores 
locais de direito constitucional, que tinham ideias 
corporativistas ou eram a favor da revisão judicial 
(Joseph-Barthélémy, Léon Duguit). 
Palavras-chave: Representação Proporcional. 
Eleições Parlamentares. Sistema Majoritário. 
Revisão Judicial.
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1 Introduction
Suum cuique. A chacun sa part
(ORBAN, 1911)2
The current crisis of political representation in the West leads to 
calls for electoral reform. Often, the majority system is seen as the source 
of unease and voter dropout. Proportional representation would be more 
able to reconcile citizens with representative democracy, bringing society 
closer to politics, or allowing for a national consensus mirroring the 
diversity of linguistic or ethnic groups.3 When it comes to implementing 
reforms in majority systems, however, the ardours are far more timid. 
Emmanuel Macron repeatedly hinted at the introduction of a ‘dose 
de proportionnelle’ for the election of the Assemblée Nationale. At the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the majority system was felt 
as a necessary guarantee against the disorders of the Fourth Republic, 
which was for the major part of its existence characterised by political 
fragmentation, reinforced by a proportional attribution of seats4.
The recent crisis of political representation has questioned the self-
evident advantages of majority systems, but the reverse is also true, as 
the protracted institutional crisis in Belgium (2007-2008, 2010-2012, 
2018-2020) or the crisis in Spain (2016, 2019) are sometimes ascribed 
to the fragmentation following from proportional representation. More 
reactionary 19th century criticism associated proportional representation 
with heresy, since it put ‘truth’ and ‘error’ on the same footing5.
2 Orban (1911) I, 46; see Bouhon (2019). 
3 Rosanvallon (2010, p. 163).  
4 Le Beguec (1986); Rouvillois (2000). For an analysis of the efect of a ‘dose de 
proportionnelle’, see Cohendet et al. (2019).
5 Orban (1911, I, p. 71).
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Advantages and disadvantages of proportional representation6 
and majority voting are classics of political science. The present paper 
is concerned with the constitutional debate in France and Belgium at the 
turn of the century, when proportional voting was introduced for Belgian 
parliamentary elections (1899) and in France (1919). The ‘D’Hondt 
system’, designed by the Ghent professor of Civil Law Victor D’Hondt 
(1841-1901), became one of the most popular formulas for seat attribution 
in the world.7 Although conceptions of justice in power relations between 
political parties dominate the debate, constitutional lawyers framed the 
discussion using the concept of national representation and constitutional 
government. This debate is also an occasion to nuance the overall image 
of Belgian dependence on France.8
The major difference from the start is the French early adoption 
of universal suffrage for men. After the experiment of the Convention 
in 1792, universal suffrage returned for good with the Revolution of 
1848. Belgium, by contrast, only abolished censitary suffrage in 1893 
for parliamentary elections, and did not introduce the ‘one man, one 
vote’ principle before 1918, under the pressure of World War One.9 
From 1893 to 1918, parliamentary suffrage was ‘plural’.10 All male 
6 Carré de Malberg rejects the very notion of proportional ‘representation’, and only 
considers proportional ‘elections’ to be theoretically conceivable, since – in his theory 
of national sovereignty – the collective corpus of voters is represented by parliament, 
not the individual voter. Hence, PR would constitute an ‘atteinte’ and a ‘deformation’ to 
representative democracy. Carré De Malberg (1922), II, 468-469, 474. On the other hand, 
Carré de Malberg recognised that the majority system created an aberration: if one of the 
competing parties would be guaranteed to govern alone, this would diminish the country’s 
right to translate its appreciation of policy into the electoral result. ibid 473-474, note 3.
7 D’Hondt would have ‘reinvented’ the calculation method used by Thomas Jeferson to 
apportion seats in the House of Representatives, according to GASSNER (1993), 1,7. 
D’HONDT (1882). See also GOBLET D’ALVIELLA (1900).
8 HEIRBAUT and STORME (2006), 3.
9 VELAERS (2009); GILISSEN (1958). On the restrictions applicable to Universal 
Sufrage in France 1848-1849, see BLACHÈR (2013).
10 Similar systems existed in England up to 1894 for the elections of the boards of 
guardians of the poor, in Swedish local elections, in New South Wales (Australia) and in 
local government in Eastern Prussia. John Stuart Mill advocated a supplementary vote for 
electors with a degree. Orban (1911) I, 35; Errera (1916), 139–140.
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inhabitants aged 25 or more11 had one vote (which they were obliged 
to cast).12 Beneficiaries of a university degree or appointed in a higher 
administrative function benefited from two extra votes and were thus 
‘triple voters’.13 Those over 2514 who either paid a rent tax of five francs15 
or owned their lodging had the right to an extra vote.16 Married men of 
at least 35 or widowers with a legitimate descent could equally claim an 
extra vote.17 In total, no individual could vote more than three times.
Furthermore, in Belgium, the Catholic Party ruled with an 
absolute majority from 1884 to 1914, irrespective of the introduction of 
proportional voting.18 The perceived vicissitudes of the D’Hondt system 
have recently been denounced for the election of MEP’s in Britain.19 
11 This age had been lowered to 21 in 1870. Barthélémy (1912), 322.
12 This obligation still exists under Belgian law. See articles 207 to 210 of the Belgian 
Electoral Code of 12 April 1894, Moniteur Belge 15 April 1894. ORBAN (1911) I, 28.
13 ERRERA (1916), 145–146. For this condition, no distinctions were operated between 
public and private institutions of higher education, as a consequence of the freedom of 
education enshrined in article 17 of the 1831 constitution. A university degree was not 
necessarily required, as certiicates of attendance at a ‘full course’ of secondary education 
of the higher degree were accepted as well. The administrative oices mentioned were 
those of governor, diplomat, member of the Royal Academy, lawyer, notary, doctor, top 
class civil servant, director of a scientiic institution, teachers, priest… See PANTENS 
(1901), 44-49.
14 For the Belgian Senate, 30 (art. 53 Constitution). ERRERA (1916), 146.
15 This tax was calculated on the rent value of a lodging, on doors and windows and on 
furniture. Not the amount of tax in itself, but ‘la présomption d’ordre social, attachée 
à la possession des bases mêmes de cet impôt’ generated the right to the privilege of a 
supplementary vote. ibid 144.
16 Property owned by wives (or minor children) was counted together with that of their 
husbands. Ownership of an immovable worth over 2 000 Belgian Francs (generating 
a cadastral, government-estimated rent income of 48 francs) or of a government bond 
annually generating more than 100 Belgian Francs of rent (art. 47 (old) Constitution, 
paragraph 2, 2°). 
17 ERRERA (1916), 143. Or, to be more precise, paying more than 5 Belgian Francs in 
the habitation tax (art. 47 (old), paragraph 2, 1°).
18 LAMBERTS & LORY (eds) (1986). 
19 In the run-up to the 2019 European Parliamentary elections, public intellectual 
Richard Dawkins called the D’Hondt system ‘ludicrous’ (sic). See https://twitter.com/
RichardDawkins/status/1130363649623777280
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These criticisms are often ill-informed.20 Another factor, district size, 
hampers the proportional character of seat attribution, especially when 
it comes to the last seats. We will come back to this point, which will 
highlight the essential innovation of the 1919 reform of seat attribution 
rules in Belgium. In contrast to Catholic and conservative Belgium, the 
French Third Republic was ruled by left-wing politicians as Jules Ferry 
(1832-1893) and Aristide Briand (1862-1932), introducing reforms such 
the law of separation between Church and State in 1905. Yet, the majority 
system did not produce stable political configurations: from 1870 to 1914, 
France had no less than thirty-three successive governments.21
In spite of these stark contrasts, Belgium and France have been 
inextricably linked in their legal culture.22 This has lead prominent 
Belgian scholars to state that the country had become ’dominated by 
France’ from the Napoleonic period on.23 Belgian 19th-century elites, 
including legal elites, spoke French.24 French political news dominated 
the frontpage of the main journals, the Liberal Indépendance belge and 
the Catholic Journal de Bruxelles.25
The major legal study on this topic has been written by a notorious 
figure of French legal academy: Joseph Barthélémy (1874-1945)26. His 
work L’organisation du suffrage. L’expérience belge (1912) lauded 
(last accessed 21 October 2019).
20 See Brandenburg 2019. One could however object, following Oscar Orban that 
‘fanatic proponents of PR would sacriice anything to the mathematical objective […] 
scrapping any remaining vote losses to arrive either at a single electoral college […] This 
is unacceptable. When one is everybody’s MP, elected by citizens spread all over the 
country, one is nobody’s MP in reality.’ ORBAN (1911) I, 45.
21HOUTTE (2014); RÉMOND (2013).
22 SOLEIL (2014); LESAFFER & VAN ERP (eds.) (2008).
23 HEIRBAUT and STORME (2006), 649.
24 VAN GOETHEM (1990). At university level, contacts existed with the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Austria. Especially German academics had been highly inluential at the 
universities of Ghent, Brussels, Louvain and Liège. See DHONDT (2012).
25 VANDER VORST ZEEGERS (1965).
26 BARTHÉLÉMY (1912); MARTINEZ (1998), 28 ; SAULNIER (2004). ‘un modèle 
d’exactitude, de clairvoyance, d’impartialité’, according to VAUTHIER (1912), 564 
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the combination of proportional representation and plural voting.27 
Barthélémy’s interest in this specific Belgian combination, however, 
cannot be seen separate from the major difference highlighted above: 
Belgium did not have universal suffrage, on which the French Third 
Republic’s parliamentary system was founded. 
2 Electoral Reform Before the Great War
In this section, electoral reform before the Great War will be discussed.
2.1 Belgium 1883: capacity suffrage for local elections, or a failed attempt to 
contain the rise of universal suffrage
In 1883, the liberal government headed by Walthère Frère-
Orban proposed to Parliament to enlarge municipal suffrage. Local and 
provincial suffrage was governed by the law, and not by the Constitution, 
which made it the ideal locus of experiments.28 Earlier (Law of 12 June 
1871), Catholic governments had attempted to transform their party’s 
domination of social life into political power by expanding census 
requirements in local elections. Under Frère-Orban’s reform, a system 
based on local taxation would be linked to the obtention of a degree of 
lower education.29 This system had been claimed for twenty years by 
27 See equally Carré de Malberg’s remark that plural voting would not necessary violate 
the principle of equal treatment between citizens. According to this famous defender 
of national sovereignty, voting rights ought to be exercised in the national, collective 
interest, and were not strictly individual, since he considered individual citizens not to 
have part in the exercise of sovereignty. CARRÉ DE MALBERG (1922), II, 471-472. 
28 BARTHÉLÉMY (1912), 12. In the same sense, Joseph Lebeau in the National Congress: 
‘l’éducation du peuple sera faite par les élections municipales et provinciales’. ibid 42.
29 In the Constituent Assembly (National Congress) of 1830-1831, capacity was seen as a 
‘privilege’, violating political equality among Belgian citizens, all (theoretically) capable 
of attaining the censitary threshold. BARTHÉLÉMY (1912), 25. The Liberal government 
sought reassurance in restricting the enlargement of the electoral corps to those who had 
graduated from an oicial, state institution. A supplementary check of degrees obtained 
in Catholic institutions, by an independent committee, was judged mandatory by the 
Liberal majority, but abandoned in the end as a violation of the principle of freedom of 
education. The Liberals reacted to an earlier reform (1871) whereby the Catholic majority 
34 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 86, p. 28-62, dez. 2020
Justice and Equality for All? Proportional Representation in Belgium and France (1883-1921)
local Liberal sections, as a ‘barrière infranchissable’ against universal 
suffrage.30 Catholics loathed it as a Chinese system of mandarinate.31 This 
liberal reform had been an attempt to tie the extension of suffrage to an 
elevation of the general level of education. The link between rational, 
positivist education in state schools and the promotion of liberalism would 
then have permitted the Liberal Party to gain control of local government. 
Unfortunately for the initiators, as with most electoral modifications, 
this short-term goal was not achieved. In 1884, the Catholic Party won 
an absolute majority in Parliament, and began an uncontested period of 
thirty years in power.
2.2 Belgium 1893: plural voting under a majority system
Je suis grand partisan de l’égalité de tous devant la loi. Je ne conçois 
pas l’égalité de tous pour faire la loi. (AUGUSTE BEERNAERT)32
L’alliance des catholiques avec le peuple contre la bourgeoisie 
voltairienne. (JOSEPH BARTHELEMY)33
A major step was taken ten years later. Massive strikes, incurring 
riots, police repression and deaths, forced Belgian Parliament to modify 
the 1831 constitution to extend parliamentary suffrage in 1893.34 The 
plural voting system was a compromise favoured by the moderate 
Catholic Cabinet Leader Auguste Beernaert (1829-1912), future Nobel 
had lowered the censitary threshold for municipal elections. This resulted in Catholic 
victories in the major cities in Flanders. ibid 82. The introduction of local capacity 
sufrage, however, lead to a decrease in the number of local electors, from about 350 000 
to 136 000 (62 800 held the degree required, the others passed a supplementary exam). 
ibid 192, 209.
30 BARTHÉLÉMY (1912), 92. Likewise, in 1890, the Liberal party introduced a proposal 
for reforming art. 47 (old) of the Constitution, linking sufrage to ‘savoir lire et écrire’, as 
an absolute minimum threshold. ibid 267.
31 BARTHÉLÉMY (1912), 117.
32 Chamber of Representatives, 28 February 1893, quoted in ibid 210.
33ibid 334. 
34 ORBAN (1911), I, 36 ; LACHAPELLE (1911) 141–143; BARTHÉLÉMY (1912) 
300–303.
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Peace Prize winner.35 Article 47 of the constitution foresaw that all male 
inhabitants above the age of twenty-five would have a single vote. Family 
fathers obtained a supplementary vote under certain conditions36, just as 
modest owners37. Finally, holders of a higher education degree benefitted 
from two supplementary votes.38 In total, no elector could have more than 
three votes. 
As a consequence, the Belgian Workers’ Party (founded in 
1885) became the second-largest political group in the Chamber of 
Representatives at the 1894 parliamentary elections.39 The Liberal Party 
crashed down to third place. This was an unexpected consequence of 
the majority system. Belgium, since 1831, had a plurinominal majority 
system. From 1877 on, lists of candidates competed for all available seats 
in a constituency.40 Hence, the Liberals were eliminated by joint lists of 
Socialists and dissident progressive Liberals in traditional strongholds, 
such as Liège. After 1894, Liberal and Socialist Parties became allies in 
proposing the introduction of proportional representation. In case of a 
run-off between Catholics and Socialists, Liberal voters were obliged to 
side with one of these blocs, which led to the erosion of their party.41
35Léopold II and Auguste Beernaert (1920).
36 Being at least 35 years of age, being married (or, in case of widowhood, having produced 
legitimate ofspring) and, inally, acquitting a personal contribution of at least ive francs. 
For details, see ORBAN (1911) I, 40.
37 Owning an immovable property of 2 000 francs, or receive a rent on movable property 
of at least 100 francs per year. See ibid I, 41.
38 ibid I, 44. Holders of a degree of higher education, either public (the State universities 
of Ghent and Liège) or private (the Catholic university in Leuven, or the Free University 
in Brussels), as well as electors assimilated to degree holders: students having completed 
a full secondary education, or having been admitted to university, as well as those 
exercising certain public positions, to be enumerated by the Electoral Law. The latter 
category allowed members of the Royal Academy, secondary school inspectors, catholic 
priests… to participate. 
39 PIERSON (1953).
40 LACHAPELLE (1911) 132. At that time, 130 000 male citizens were entitled to vote 
in parliamentary elections.
41 ERRERA (1916) 153.
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In 1894, 853 628 electors had one vote, 203 678 could vote twice, 
and 223 381 electors had three votes. In total, 1 370 687 voters controlled 
2 111 127 votes.42 The Catholic Party obtained 104 seats out of 152 in 
the Chamber of Representatives, the Liberal Party 20 and the Belgian 
Workers’ Party 28.43 Ten years earlier, the country had counted just 
124 378 voters.44 
2.3 Belgium 1895: plural voting for local elections under a mixed, neo-
corporatist system
Le grand principe national de la poire coupée en deux. (GEORGES 
LORAND, 30 March 1895, Chamber of Representatives)45
Auguste Beernaert’s compromise was despised by the most 
conservative group within the Catholic Party, namely the Fédération 
des Associations et Cercles Catholiques. Beernaert had to resign after 
ten years as Cabinet Leader (1884-1894),46 and was succeeded by 
the conservative Jules de Burlet (1844-1897). The latter introduced a 
stringent reform of Frère-Orban’s system of municipal capacity voting. 
Plural suffrage was extended to the municipal election, albeit with the 
possibility to add a fourth vote, increasing the gap between labourers (one 
vote) and wealthy landowners (four votes). The age threshold was raised 
to 30 years, excluding many potential left-wing voters. An additional 
requirement of three years of residence within the same municipality 
prevented the highly mobile group of labourers from fully participating. 
42 WILLEMS (1896), 8. However, in constituencies were the number of candidates was 
equal to the number of vacant seats, no election was held. This deprived the Catholics of 
a certain number of votes, whereas they still kept the seat. LACHAPELLE (1911) 150.
43 LUYKX (1978), 208.
44 BARTHÉLÉMY (1912) 305.
45 Quoted in ibid, 640. Liberal MP for Virton-Neufchâteau. See Lauwers (2018).
46 Conservative Catholics and part of the Liberal MPs rejected Beernaert’s proposal 
of partial PR, limited to constituencies with at least 2 MPs to elect, keeping nine 
constituencies returning a single MP. LACHAPELLE (1911), 144. All 17 liberal MPs 
who rejected Beernaert’s PR proposal were ousted at the following legislative elections. 
ibid 151.
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Finally, in boroughs counting over 20 000 inhabitants, supplementary 
seats were allotted to representatives of employers and workers.47 
Ultramontanist ideas of corporatism could reinforce this anti-socialist 
buffer.48 Naturally, the Belgian Workers’ Party decried this loi des quatre 
infamies (‘Law of the four disgraces’). 
Most importantly for the present paper, the majority system was 
amended for local purposes. If a single list conquered the majority of all 
votes expressed, it would obtain all seats in the local council. However, 
if it failed to (which was the case in most larger towns), proportional 
representation (the D’Hondt system)49 would be used in the second round. 
The Catholics hereby hoped to retain absolute power (without opposition) 
on the countryside, and divide their Socialist and Liberal opponents in the 
major cities.50 This first and biased introduction of PR at the local level 
nevertheless helped to institutionalise the method in Belgium.51
2.4 Belgium 1899: proportional representation for parliamentary elections
Était-il même prudent, de la part des catholiques, de conserver un 
mode de scrutin qui lui assurait sans doute des majorités écrasantes, 
47 ORBAN (1911) I, 69. This ‘representation’ of interests was even defended by Liberals 
in Belgium (Emile De Laveleye, Charles Buls), but ran counter to the main objection that 
interests in society could not be ixed anymore as they were under the Old Regime’s system 
of guilds and corporations. The main objective of a system of interest representation 
is to ofer a counterweight to the atomised and individual conception of citizenship 
and electoral participation. Its proponents hope that major electoral swings would be 
eliminated, giving rise to stable societal and political relations. Orban personally feared 
the irrevocable introduction of the class struggle in Parliament. See ibid I, 55–57.
48 A socialist breakthrough at the local level was associated with the spectre of the Parisian 
Commune. In Belgium and France alike, socialist ‘municipalisme’ was a breakthrough 
strategy. HOUTTE (2014), 200.
49 LACHAPELLE (1911) 165.
50 A similar idea underpinned the proposal by Cabinet leader Vandenpeerenboom in 1899: 
PR would be reserved for the constituencies were Catholics had less chance to conquer 
the majority: Ghent, Antwerp, Brussels, Liège, Louvain, Charleroi and Mons. Ibid, 155.
51 ERRERA (1916) 153.
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mais qui avait pour effet de supprimer brutalement le parti libéral? 
(GEORGES LACHAPELLE)52
De Burlet’s conservative law generated the risk that Catholics could 
be eliminated altogether from city councils, when Socialists and Liberals 
would constitute a single list and obtain the majority. This happened in 
Antwerp and Brussels in 1911.53 Yet, the majority system endangered the 
stability of the parliamentary system as a whole. Violent street protests, 
and even an invasion of Parliament, forced the Catholic Party’s hand. 
Under pressure of an ad hoc-coalition of Socialists, Liberals and its 
own Christian Democrat wing, with the support of King Leopold II, the 
Catholic majority introduced proportional representation in 1899.54
Seats would be shared out in proportion to every political party’s 
share of the vote. However, careful not to squander its domination 
in the countryside, the Catholic Party stuck to a system of relatively 
small constituencies, where only 2 to 3 seats were available.55 In rural 
52 LACHAPELLE (1911) 152.  
53 WILS (2017), 158. Errera notes that the 1895 lois des quatre infamies introduced PR 
for the irst time in Belgium and contributed to the institutionalisation of the practice.
54 Former Cabinet Leader Beernaert rose to the defence of PR in parliament. See Het 
Laatste Nieuws, 6 April 1898. An often-cited ratio for the introduction of PR is that ‘on 
ajourne à jour indéterminé la dictature de la classe ouvrière pour la révolution sociale’ 
(BARTHÉLÉMY (1912), 618). Proportional representation renders a Socialist absolute 
majority less likely. Hence the ideological opposition of Walloon far-left socialist MPs as 
Alfred Defuisseaux (1843-1901), who saw ‘l’Infâme Proporz’ as a treason of the socialist 
ideal of class warfare, and hoped to suppress it, once Universal Sufrage would have been 
in place. A second frequently mentioned motive is the wish to guarantee the representation 
of minorities in both the Dutch- and French-speaking provinces. Barthélémy linked this to 
a statement by Simeon Stern, president of the New York PR association, arguing that PR 
could have avoided the American Civil War. ibid 628 note 1. Proportional representation 
should not be confused with systems of guaranteed representation of minorities, which 
allow the elector to choose only a fraction of the seats available through a majoritarian 
system, reserving some seats to the minority party. This system was used in Spain, Brazil, 
Portugal and (incidentally) Britain and Italy. ORBAN (1911), I, 67.
55 LACHAPELLE (1911), 44. Orban considered districts with only two seats as 
problematic. In 1911, this was still the case for the sole district of Virton-Neufchâteau, 
whereas the districts of Hasselt, Tongres, Arlon, Turnhout, Thuin, Termonde, Audenaerde 
and Ypres returned 3 MPs. ORBAN (1911), I, 76. Recently (5 December 2007, 26 
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areas, Socialists nor Liberals bothered to propose a list of candidates!56 
Consequently, the Catholic Party obtained 86 seats out of 152 at 
the elections of 27 March 1900. A loss of 16, but still more than the 
recrudescent Liberal Party (33) and the Socialist Party (32) taken 
together.57
Proportional representation was introduced to soften the opposition 
between conservative Flanders, dominated by Catholics, and the 
increasingly more Socialist boroughs in the Walloon steel basin, a region 
which had developed significantly due to the Industrial Revolution.58 
Paul Errera (1860-1922)59 notes in his Traité de droit public belge that 
the advent of the Socialist parliamentary group in 1894 was feared to 
bring about the disappearance of parliamentarism itself, just as it would 
undo the traditional bipartisan system of Catholics and Liberals.60 The 
perspective of facing solely the Socialists as opposition exposed the 
November 2015), the Belgian Constitutional Court found that districts returning less than 
4 MPs were unconstitutional. See BOUHON, JOUSTEN & VROLIX (2018) 5.
56 This reinforced the efect of the Jeferson/D’Hondt system, which tends to beneit major 
parties. GASSNER (1993), 8. It is often thought that the Catholic Party would have 
come under the ever greater inluence of Christian Democrat (labour union) and Flemish 
Nationalist politicians. Recent work tends to nuance this, emphasising the enduring 
impact of conservatives: VAN VELTHOVEN (2014).
57 Luykx (1978), 208.
58 On 22 December 1899, at the proposal’s inal debate in the Belgian Senate, Catholic 
Senator and legal scholar Edouard Descamps (1847-1933) hoped that the representation 
(and expression) of ideas would be untangled from their previous sectarian link with 
societal groups, linguistic classiications, the opposition between city, industrial centres 
and countryside. Libon & Nandrin (2016), 83-84. According to historian Lode Wils, 
proportional representation allowed the anti-Catholic Walloon movement to stop the low 
of linguistic measures in Belgium until 1914. Wils (2019), 154, 158. Lachapelle, on the 
other hand, notes socialist resistance in Hainaut against the idea of PR, since this implied 
sharing part of the cake with other political parties. The General Council of the Belgian 
Workers’ Party, however, rejected this objection. Lachapelle (1911), 161, 167.
59 Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles since 1896 (rector from 1908 to 1911), 
mayor of Uccle (1912-1921), member of the Royal Academy of Belgium (1919) and of 
the Israelite Consistory of Belgium.Velu (1994).
60 Errera (1916), 153.
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dangers of the majority system. If the elector is forced to choose between 
two alternatives, the system logically leads to a victory of the other pole.
Paul Errera explains proportional representation as a ‘Third Way’ 
of representation, allowing to avoid the disadvantages of uninominal 
majority (which lead to the ‘triomphe des médiocrités sur les hommes de 
grande valeur’)61 and plurinominal majority systems (leading the elector 
to vote for candidates which he has not chosen himself)62. 
Proportional representation allowed the coexistence of multiple 
parties, which softened the impact of lists. Errera points to the feeble 
majority at parliamentary elections in the district of Brussels in 1893. 
18 seats at a stroke could shift due to a couple of hundred or even 
dozens votes.63 On the conceptual level, Errera explained proportional 
representation as a more adjusted and specific concept of the electoral 
function.64 First, Errera agreed that the majority rule – within Parliament 
– was indispensable. The minority had to acquiesce when a majority of 
representatives agree on voting a law. However, there was no fatality for 
the elector himself to see his choice evaporate when it did not conform 
to not that of the majority of the votes cast. In other words, a distinction 
between ‘droit de décision’, a corollary of the parliamentary function, and 
‘droit de représentation’. The latter is designed to help citizens exercise 
their part of national sovereignty, not to favour a specific government.65
61 Ibid 152.
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid 152 and 154. On the majority system: ‘À cette époque, les journées électorales 
étaient littéralement des journées de bataille, qui parfois laissaient des blessés, sinon 
des morts ; elles ofraient de vrais coups de hasard.’ Further examples can illustrate the 
uncertainty provoked by the system: in 1878, the Catholic Party had 3 232 votes more than 
its Liberal competitor, but lost the majority of seats in the Chamber of Representatives. 
In 1886, 24 615 Catholic votes obtained 44 seats, whereas 23 484 liberal votes (barely 
1 200 less) only 2. The last elections under the censitary system gave the Liberals 34 seats 
with 52 198 votes. The Catholics, who obtained only 6 000 more votes, gained the double 
number of seats (68). Lachapelle (1911), 132, 138, 140.
64 Errera (1916), 154.
65 Lachapelle (1911), 49.
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Of course, Errera pursued, direct democracy, or legislation through 
referenda, could provide an alternative to the problem of representation: 
citizens would become legislators themselves. This would render the 
triumph of the ‘yes’ acceptable to those who opted for ‘no’.66 Yet, within 
the representative system, the question of the weight accorded to an 
elector’s choice would be one for ‘mathematicians, not politicians’ to 
resolve.67
66 See the intervention of the Communist Deputy Henri Baranton (1895-1976) in the 
Chambre des Députés in 1927, who vowed to break the ‘strike of the capitalists’ (or 
speculation against left-wing policies) by having recourse to permanent referenda, rather 
than the ‘systèmes grossiers, burlesques, primitifs’ wherein men were given full powers to 
legislate during several years. J.O. D.P. CdD, 7 July 1927, col. 2389. The same criticism of 
representative democracy, albeit only in combination with the majority system, was given 
by the radical socialist Camille Pelletan (1846-1915) in June 1911: ‘nous prétendons que 
le people n’a plus d’autre maître que lui-même. Et ce souverain, dont vous proclamez le 
droit imprescriptible, vous allez lui donner la parole une fois, une fois unique pendant 
douze heures tous les autre ans.’ J.O. D.P. CdD, 2 June 1911, Col. 2501. Pelletan lamented 
the estrangement caused by the Parisian bubble vis-à-vis French electors: ‘A peine élus, 
nous venons vivre ici, enveloppés par les préoccupations qui naissent dans l'air renfermé 
de nos couloirs, par les impressions, par les engouements de ce grand Molinchard qu’on 
appelle le Tout-Paris, probablement parce qu’il forme une portion très petite de la grande 
capitale et qu’il s’en sépare lui-même, par son dédain, d’un fossé infranchissable.’ In 
the end, Pelletan leaned towards referenda as well: ‘Je ne puis m’empêcher de trouver 
qu’un Parlement républicain, qu’un Parlement pénétré de la pensée de la souveraineté 
nationale fait un acte de folie, oui de folie véritable quand, pendant quatre ans, il renonce 
à jeter un coup de sonde dans ce qu’il y au fond de la pensée de ce pays.’ In the same sense, 
Carré de Malberg likened proportional representation to an intermediate stage, bordering 
on direct democracy (Carré de Malberg (1922), II, 474). Finally, this brought Pelletan to 
condemn the Belgian system of political parties. Pelletan feared Jaures’s insistence on 
l’esprit d’association would lead to situations whereby party insiders would dress a list, 
and thus ‘enregimenter, endoctriner, régenter le sufrage universel!’ (Ibid., col. 2052). 
Yet, one could also object, in Orban’s words that ‘committees and party headquarters’ are 
still ‘better than the almighty, plotting local clans in small constituencies’. Orban (1911) 
I, 49. On the latter aspect, see Marty, 2016.
67 Orban (1911) I, 71; Errera (1916) 155. See Benoist (1895); Willems (1896); Ihl (2013), 
387. For an example of a mathematician’s work, see Lachapelle (1911). Lachapelle 
interviewed many French and Belgian protagonists, among which Charles Benoist, 
Jean Jaurès, Raymond Poincaré, Paul Deschanel, Jules Van den Heuvel, Eugène Goblet 
d’Alviella, Georges Lorand, Emile Vandervelde and Victor Van de Walle. See equally, on 
42 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 86, p. 28-62, dez. 2020
Justice and Equality for All? Proportional Representation in Belgium and France (1883-1921)
Proportional representation conforms best to the veracity of the 
electoral result. New parties can break through at the national level. If 
front bench candidates are elected as most prominent candidates on the 
list, lesser known homines novi can enter parliament through the system 
of suppléants or replacement candidates.68 Errera sincerely hoped that 
PR would undo the fixed relationship between a one-party parliamentary 
majority and its cabinet, and preferred ‘des majorités d’un jour, ce qui 
nous changera des accords constants et souvent funestes’.69 
3 French Debates Before 1914: ‘Affranchir le suffrage 
universel’’70
Les inconvénients arithmétiques du régime majoritaire ne sont rien 
auprès de ses inconvénients moraux. (HENRI POINCARE)71
Le péril pour la République n’est point désormais du côté de la 
droite. Il est ailleurs. Il est dans l’immoralité des mœurs politiques 
et électorales qu’a perpétuées le scrutin d’arrondissement, dans les 
excès de la candidature officielle, dans les abus du favoritisme qui 
ont suscité un moment de révolte.’
(GEORGES LACHAPELLE on the 1910 elections for the Chambre 
des Députés)72
PR as an alternative to direct democracy, or a means to save representative democracy: 
Rosanvallon (2010), 162. 
68 Introduced by the Law of 29 December 1899. Replacement candidates were considered 
to have been conditionally elected (awaiting the decease or resignation of an efectively 
elected MP). Orban (1911), I, 85; Errera (1916), 155. Errera further contends that the 
freedom of the elector had not been endangered by the advent of more organised mass 
parties: liberal and Catholic electoral associations had obtained such results in the past, 
that often candidates were elected ‘sans lutte’, eliminating thereby the possibility to 
compete for the minority. If ‘l’électeur est vinculé dans son choix’, these limitations are 
nothing but the sound consequence of societal organisation itself. 
69 Errera (1916), 156.
70 Lachapelle (1911), 46.
71 Foreword in ibid, IV.
72 Ibid, 9.
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Notre ami Vandervelde a dit que s’il était socialiste français, il 
regarderait à deux fois et s’il était radical français, à trois fois, avant 
d’établir en France la représentation proportionnelle. (ERNEST 
BRETON, Chambre des Députés, 24 October 1909)73
Let’s now turn to France. Activism for proportional representation 
generated leaflets, pamphlets and treatises in both Belgium and its 
neighbour country. The Ligue pour la représentation proportionnelle 
held meetings in Paris as well as in Brussels.74 Its advocates presented 
proportional representation as an advance of humanity in general.75 This 
idea was not utopian, since, at a mere five hour train ride from Paris, a 
more advanced and civilised system of seat distribution was already 
in operation. Personal exchanges with leading Belgian politicians 
73 Quoted in Barthélémy (1912), 621.
74 The Belgian Ligue was founded in 1881, twenty-six years after the creation of a similar 
league in Geneva (Lachapelle (1911) 133; Orban (1911) I, 69). Future Cabinet leader 
Auguste Beernaert was a founding member, just as Victor D’Hondt and the political 
economist Emile de Laveleye (1822-1892). The Ligue pour la RP in France (1901) was 
more militant version of the Société pour l’étude de la RP, Paris, 1883 (RDILC 1884, 
414 and Rosanvallon (2010) 154, 161, with inter alia Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Emile 
Boutmy. Raymond Saleilles equally proposed proportional representation in the 1900 
world conference of comparative law (Sacriste, 2012, 357, 366 and Richard, 2017, 15). 
Foundation of an Italian Associazione per lo studio della rappresentanza proportionale 
in 1872 (RDILC 1872, 355). Hence Jaurès’s remark in 1911 that PR had been a ‘solitary 
conception of some academics’ thirty years earlier. J.O. D.P. CdD, 2 June 1911, col. 
2497. See also the Commission d’études du comité républicain de la R.P.: Anatole Leroy-
Beaulieu, Ernest Lavisse, Henri Poincaré. Lachapelle (1911) I–II. Foreword by Henri 
Poincaré: ‘la cause de la représentation proportionnelle est gagnée auprès de tous ceux 
qui réléchissent, pour peu qu’ils ne soient pas aveuglés par l’intérêt ou la passion’, or in 
Lachapelle’s own introduction: ‘L’idée de la RP a été propagée en France, en Angleterre, 
en Italie, en Belgique, en Suisse, au Danemark – et on peut le dire dans tous les pays 
civilisés – par les esprits les plus éminents, par les serviteurs les plus désintéressés de 
la justice et du droit’. In 1885, an international conference convened in Antwerp, in the 
margins of the Universal Exhibition, proclaiming its adherence to the D’Hondt system as 
‘un mode pratique et rigoureux de réaliser la représentation proportionnelle’ (Ibid, 137). 
The Association published its own journal, Représentation proportionnelle.
75 Report on a lecture held before the Grand-Orient of France, Paris, 15 November 1901, 
in Le Siècle¸18 November (consulted on Retronews (BnF), last accessed 21 October 
1901: https://www.retronews.fr/journal/le-siecle/18-novembre-1901/93/439973/1). 
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and scholars fuelled French PR activism.76 Belgian Liberal MP Paul 
Janson77 was quoted in the Chambre des Députés, praising the election 
of Socialist and Liberal MPs ‘infeudated’ to the Catholics for centuries.78 
Conservative Catholic politician Charles Woeste’s denunciation of ‘des 
foyers d’infection’ through the disparate election of Liberal and Socialist 
MPs were eagerly noted by the French left. In his review of Barthélémy’s 
elaborate study on the Belgian system, ULB law professor Maurice 
Vauthier (1860-1931) noted that many French observers were seeing 
proportional representation as the ‘élixir merveilleux dont […] un grand 
nombre de ses compatriotes, attend la régénération du régime electoral 
de la France’.79 The absence of true universal suffrage in Belgium 
frustrated Socialist and Liberal attempts to do away with the Catholic 
absolute majority.80 Barthélémy would not have understood the profound 
nature of the confessional divide in Belgian politics and society.81
Legal historian and constitutional lawyer Adhémar Esmein (1848-
1923) criticised proportional representation and favoured the ‘simple’ 
76 E.g. the founder of the French Ligue pour la RP, the journalist Yves Guyot’s report on 
his visit to Brussels in November 1901, including meetings with Paul Janson (progressive 
liberal), Paul Hymans (traditional liberal) and Eugène Goblet d’Alviella in Le Siècle.
77 ‘Le Gambetta belge’ Barthélémy (1912), 171.
78 Thomson in the Chambre des Députés, June 1911. J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 
2493.Esmein 1903.
79 Vauthier (1912) 565. On Vauthier (professor at the ULB since 1890, Rector 1903-
1905, Member of the Royal Academy in 1907, Senator in 1921, Home Secretary in 1927, 
Minister for Science and the Arts 1927-1931), see Dekkers (1965).
80 In the 1912 elections, the opposition fell 100 000 votes short of beating the Catholic 
Party. Since this party dominated the Flemish provinces, Socialist and Liberal French-
speaking politicians felt as if they would never see the day on which Flemish domination 
would end. Supressing plural vote was thus – logically – high on the agenda for the 
opposition, and resented as great an injustice as the majority system. Vauthier (1912) 566–
567. Many observers judged the D’Hondt system reinforced the position of the Catholic 
party. The unity of the party would be assured thanks to the (slight) advantage given to 
the highest scoring list. Conversely, if Socialists and Liberals were condemned to form 
a ‘cartel’ against the predominance of the Catholic Party, more moderate Liberal voters 
would desert them. Lachapelle (1911) 111. For an excellent, simple and straightforward 
explanation of the diference between the D’Hondt system and the residuary mean-
system, see Ibid, 113–117.
81 Vauthier (1912), 567.
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and clear majority system.82 The root of Esmein’s criticism resided in 
his equation of the right of representation to a collective right, of which 
the Nation was the bearer, and not the individual. Raymond Carré de 
Malberg (1861-1935) followed Esmein in stating that proportional 
elections were nothing but a purported disguise of a denaturation of the 
French representative system. Proportional elections were based on ideas 
of proportional representation, a necessary step in a descent towards 
direct government. Proportional representation would have created ‘semi-
representative’ government, where the monopoly of MPs to represent the 
nations was encroached on by individual voters.83 
Errera (cf. supra) applied the distinction between the majority rule 
for the decisional function of MPs and proportional representation for 
their election. Carré de Malberg vehemently rejected this idea. From the 
moment of their election on, MPs should not worry about the ‘diverse 
and heterogenous elements composing the electoral corps’, but should see 
themselves as the ‘exclusive organ of the nation by which it can express 
a will’.84 The representatives of the nation did not have to worry to ensure 
a representation of all opinions or interests within the assembly, ‘à aucun 
moment, pas même à l’époque des élections’.85
Yet, the same political criticism as in Belgium existed in La Grande 
Nation.86 Gambetta chastised the disproportionate effect in seats of a 
handful of voters changing their minds.87 Thomson, by contrast, defended 
the ‘majorité homogène et compacte’ brought about by Universal Suffrage 
in France. There could not even be a Republic, if the will of the majority 
could not dominate!88 This argument is refuted by Errera in his treatise. 
82 Professor at the Paris Law Faculty, Deputy Director at the EPHE. See Sacriste (2012), 
254–281.
83 Carré de Malberg (1922), II, 478. Carré refuted the theory proposed by Saripolos 1899. 
See Beaud (2012) and Deroussin (2013), 167.
84 Ibid II, 479.
85 Ibid.
86 ‘Im Idealfall der Proportionalwahl gibt es keinen Besiegten, weil es keine Majorisierung 
gibt’ Kelsen (1925) 348.
87 Cited by Blaisot (republican) in 1927. J.O. D.P. CdD, col. 2298.
88 Thomson, June 1911. J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2494.
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Yet, specific French circumstances explain Thomson’s point of view: in 
his speech, he refers to the intrusion of a multitude of political parties, 
among which some might even be suspected to be unconstitutional. 
In other words, Thomson refers to the Legitimists, who favoured the 
restauration of monarchy in France.89 An ‘imposing republican majority’ 
was a necessity. Otherwise, no reform whatsoever would have been 
possible. 
Léon Duguit (1859-1928) was more favourably inclined towards 
proportional representation, and did not envisage the opposition 
between representation and proportional elections.90 In his Manuel de 
droit constitutionnel, he inventoried the frequent criticism of the French 
majority system. First, the arbitrary consequences following from 
the combination of a majority in parliament and the majority principle 
in the designation of MPs. The controversial law on the separation of 
Church and State had been voted by representatives in the Chambre 
des Députés assembling in total 2,6 out of 10 million French voters.91 
Condorcet (1743-1794),92 Victor Considérant (1808-1893),93 John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873) and Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), all three famous names, 
advocated replacing the inequitable majority system. Yet, Duguit thought 
the question was asked in the wrong way. Not proportionality between 
89 Ibid.
90 This is explained by Guillaume Sacriste as part of the general tendency of provincial 
constitutional lawyers to challenge the core of the French Third Republic: parliamentary 
sovereignty and universal sufrage. Duguit proposed in 1895 to abolish the Sénat and 
replace it by a representation of interests, as an allusion on the ‘esprit syndical’. Sacriste 
(2012) 447–450; Rosanvallon (2010), 117 ; Deroussin (2013), 160.
91 Duguit (1907), 362. Garchery quoted supplementary numbers: 5 159 000 votes for 
elected MPs in 1902, but 5 818 000 for those who lost. In 1906: 5 209 000 votes for 
elected MPs, but 6 383 852 for non-elected candidates. In 1914, 57% of French voters 
were not represented. 
92 Intervention by Senator Louis Martin (1859-1944), founder of the Ligue antiplébiscitaire, 
J.O. Sénat, 13 March 1913, p. 217.
93 See also the left-wing republican Gaston Thomson (1848-1932)’s intervention in the 
Chambre des Députés in June 1911, on Girardin’s proposal to create a collègue unique for 
the whole of France, giving every elector the right to choose his candidate over the whole 
of France. J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2492.
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political ideas as such, but a guarantee for the representation of minorities 
counted most.94
Arguments in favour of proportional representation did not 
only emerge from the voters’ interest to be liberated from the yoke of 
local potentates, but also from deputies’ own freedom.95 In 1927, the 
Communist Jean Garchery (1872-1957) called upon his colleagues to 
liberate themselves from the ‘servitude’ of their local constituency, in 
order to exercise their parliamentary voting right in dignity, with morality, 
preferring the battle of ideas to the battle of persons.96 ‘Malheur à qui 
voudra se réfugier dans l’arrondissement’: small constituencies were the 
political graveyard of big ideas.97 
A second argument on MP’s freedom was the ‘ignoble second tour’. 
In the second round, French politicians were obliged to cater to the needs 
of other voters than those who supported them in the first round, leading 
to the sacrifice of ‘ceux du premier tour qui pensent comme lui, mais dont 
il est sûr’.98 
The most eloquent advocate of proportional representation was Jean 
Jaurès (1859-1914). In 1910, the French legislative elections were won 
by the Radical-Republican-Socialist Party and the Socialist Republican 
Party, of which many members favoured PR. Jaurès (SFIO) challenged 
the idea that a majority of Frenchmen could be constituted by the 
addition of local majorities.99 According to Jaurès, the equal right of all 
citizens to control and direct human activity was the founding principle 
of sovereignty. The majority can only decide if is built on fundamentally 
equal individuals. Jaurès noted the marginal position of proportional 
94 Duguit (1907), 363.
95 For a chronological overview of discussions in the Chambre des Députés up to the law 
of 12 July 1919: Esmein and Nézard (1921) 299–309.
96 J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2387.
97 HoutTe (2014), 184. 
98 Lachapelle (1911), V. See also Orban (1911) I, 49. PR would distort the ‘nature of 
national representation’, and ‘destroy electors’ freedom [...] compelled to through 
themselves in immoral coalitions or to abstain.’
99 J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2495.
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representation only three to four decades earlier, and its remarkable rise 
in countries with an intense political activity. He attributed this rise to 
the ‘esprit d’association’, or the necessity to integrate individuals within 
social structures such as trade unions.100 This movement was essential! 
Without the esprit d’association, universal suffrage risked destroying 
itself through fragmentation in parliament.101 Proportional representation 
ought thus to generate political parties, or in Rosanvallon’s words 
‘appréhender le pluralisme social sous les espèces du pluralisme des 
partis’.102
Jaurès recalled that the growth of the French state had been a 
consequence of administrative centralisation. Local resistance had 
been broken during the French revolution. If the legislative branch of 
government allowed itself to be splintered in hundreds of small fiefs, the 
executive would wield excessive power.103 Proportional representation 
would arouse voters’ attention: finally they would be free to vote for an 
idea, rather than for a local face. Furthermore, without regular reform, 
Jaurès warned, systems of freedom (‘les régimes de liberté’) would 
inevitably come to their end. Even if there would probably not be a 
majority for the socialisation of all individual property, he was persuaded 
that one could be found for a minimum programme of social reform.104 
100 Le Beguec (1986), 73. The Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), until recently 
France’s most prominent labour union, was founded in 1895, precisely in this era. Houtte 
(2014), 200. The CGT campaigned on the speciic reforms Jaurès pleaded for, such as the 
eight hour-working day.
101 Lachapelle (1911), 53–66. See in a similar vein, Belgian arguments pro PR and against 
the ‘esprit de clocher’: De Smaele (1999). 
102 Rosanvallon (2010) 164; See Orban’s defence of political parties: ‘don’t believe 
political parties would be a weakness and an illness of the modern state. They are both 
the condition and proof of a strong political life.’ Orban further relies on Bluntschli to 
state that ‘parties are constituted and blossom in a healthy nation, whereas factions are 
the sign of a sick society.’ Orban (1911), I, 59; Kelsen (1925), 351. Kelsen, however, 
warned for suicient democratic safeguards within political parties, in order to avoid the 
‘dictatorship’ of party leaders.
103 Jaurès, June 1911. J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2498.
104 Detailed by Jaurès further on in his speech: 1° an income tax, 2° working men’s pensions 
3° social insurance 4° weekly mandatory rest for all workers 5° restrictions on home 
labour. Jaurès thought these proposals infuriated many petty lobbies, capable of rigging 
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Individual strife between local potentates should not divide political 
forces with a higher calling.105
When reacting to these arguments, equally put forward by 
Barthélémy106, Vauthier was not convinced of the impact PR had had 
on party organisation, nor on the focus on an elevated debating climate 
dominated by high ideas. To his interpretation, Belgium was locked in a 
linguistic crisis, which PR could not have prevented.107
PR was adopted in 1912 by the Chambre des Députés, but defeated 
in the French Sénat in 1913. The radicals of Georges Clemenceau (1841-
1929) and Emile Combes (1835-1921) swung against the text adopted by 
the Chambre des Députés and dropped their support.108
4 After the Great War: the end of the “Belgian Laboratory”
In this section, the end of the “Belgian Laboratory” will be discus-
sed after the Great War.
4.1 Belgium 1918-1921: the advent of ‘pure’ PR for parliamentary election, 
and the defeat of the ‘loi des quatre infamies’
Belgium introduced Universal Suffrage under pressure. Contra 
constitutionem, the elections of November 1918 were organised without 
the double and triple voting system of 1893. Politically and morally, the 
government felt it impossible to discriminate against the one vote-electors 
who had risked or given their lives in the Great War, especially with 
elections in small constituencies (arrondissements, as opposed to the département, the 
scale at which proponents of proportional representation in France saw the appropriate 
scale for fair elections). J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2498.
105 Jaurès believed that alcohol abuse in the West of France was due to the systematic 
lobbying of the local industry, and thought they would not be able to control parliament 
any more under proportional representation. J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2498.
106 Vauthier (1912), 565; Barthélémy (1912), 715.
107 See equally Wils (2017), 158–183.
108 HouTte (2014), 374; Lachapelle, (1913). For the broader movement underpinning PR 
advocacy, see Marty (2013).
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the spectre of the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia in the background.109 
Two million voters participated in the elections, without any distinction 
according to wealth or education. Consequently, the Catholic Party lost 
its absolute majority, opening the era of coalition government, where 
proportional representation represented justice between political parties. 
The Catholics came down to 73 seats out of 186 (a loss of 26 seats). 
The Socialists gained 30 seats and obtained 70 MPs in the Chamber 
of Representatives. The Liberal Party lost slightly, but maintained 
its representation. For the first time, five Flemish Nationalists were 
elected.110
The introduction of the one man, one vote-principle was not the 
only innovation in electoral law. First, the loi des quatre infamies was 
necessarily sacrificed to the exigencies of the Belgian Workers’ Party. 
Second, the iniquitous small constituencies on the countryside had to 
become true territories of democracy.111
Municipal elections were held according to pure universal suffrage, 
including suffrage for women.112 The major reform of parliamentary 
elections consisted in allowing for the regrouping of surplus votes at 
provincial level. Seats were distributed first in constituencies. Yet, if it 
was not possible to attribute seats directly, the remaining seats were 
allotted to the parties with the highest number of remaining votes at a 
higher level. In total, the repartition of seats was conformable to what 
would have been the outcome if the election had taken place at the 
provincial level. Consequently, votes for Socialist, Liberal, Communist or 
Flemish Nationalist candidates in rural areas were not lost anymore, but 
counted together with those expressed in the provincial capital. Whereas 
109 Velaers (2009), 464-468. The new electoral law lowered the minimum age to 21, thus 
including soldiers aged between 21 and 25. 
110 Luykx (1978), 291. 
111 Provinces of Luxembourg, West Flanders, Limburg, Namur. E.g. at the parliamentary 
elections of 1900 in Limburg, the Liberal party’s share of the vote (1/6 of all votes) ought 
to have been suicient to gain one seat out of the six seats available in the province. 
However, the Catholic party managed to conquer all seats in both districts, which required 
a third of the votes as minimum threshold. 
112 Female sufrage was opposed by the Socialist and Liberal parties, by fear of Catholic 
domination. Velaers (2009) 512, 566-568.
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the one man one vote-principle had killed off the Catholic absolute 
majority, the new system of apparentement, inspired by the Liberal MP 
Victor Van de Walle (1849-1927),113 assured an equitable distribution of 
seats between rural and urban areas.114 Hence, the ‘effets détestables’ of 
the D’Hondt system in small constituencies could be resolved.115 
4.2 France 1919: a conditional PR experiment
France introduced proportional representation for the election of the 
Chambre des Députés with the law of 12 July 1919.116 This text was a 
compromise, out of fear of too much fragmentation in the representative 
landscape. Candidates obtaining the absolute majority of votes were 
automatically elected. Proportional representation only became applicable 
for those seats where no individual candidate had obtained an absolute 
majority.117 Furthermore, under certain conditions, the largest party 
113VAN DE WALLE (1910). Kelsen warned against small territorial constituencies, 
leading to a deprivation of seats for smaller parties, even under a formal PR system: 
‘Tatsächlich führt es zu sehr bedeutenden Störungen der Proportionalität des 
Gesamtergebnisses, wenn bei der Parlamentswahl […] und das Proportionalitätsprinzip 
nur innerhalb der territorialen Wahlkörper Platz greift’. KELSEN (1925), 351. The 
Belgian system between 1899 and 1921 is an illustration of this risk. ibid.
114 Law of 22 October 1919. Velaers (2009); Verleden (2015), 61.
115 Words of Gaston Thomson, Chambre des Députés, J.O. Chambre des Députés, 22 June 
1911, col. 2493. See also Bouhon, Jousten and Vrolix (2018).
116 Loi portant modiication aux lois organiques sur l’élection des députés et établissant le 
scrutin de liste avec représentation proportionnelle, 12 July 1919, Bulletin des Lois 1919, 
II, 2096. This distributed seats in the Chambre des Députés according to the outcome 
of a division of a department’s population by 75 000 (art. 2), with a minimum of 3 MPs 
per department (art. 3). This contrasted with the previous unequal representation, as 
exempliied by the 3.446 electors of Barcelonette in 1910, who elected one MP, just as 
those of Versailles, with 36.472, or the tenfold of registered voters (Lachapelle (1911) 
15). Art. 10 instated the calculation of a division number (outcome of the votes cast, 
divided by the number of MPs to elect). Lists obtained seats proportionate to the result 
of this calculation. The remaining seats were attributed following la plus forte moyenne. 
No seats were attributed if less than half of the registered electors turned up, or if no list 
obtained the electoral division number (art. 13).
117 Carré de Malberg (1922) II, 469, note 1. Esmein and Nézard (1921), 310.
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received a bonus.118 Hence, Carré de Malberg contended that individual 
voters would have acquired the quality of organ of the nation, which he 
reserved for elected MPs only.119 
In the 1925 edition of his Allgemeine Staatslehre, the Austrian 
constitutional lawyer Hans Kelsen ironically remarked that the shift away 
from Carré de Malberg’s idea of the nation as a collective sovereign had 
not always been evident (‘selbstverständlich’). Kelsen recognised Carré 
de Malberg’s reasoning was correct: proportional representation implied 
that not the Gesamtwählerschaft (all voters), but Teilkörper (parts of the 
electorate) became the bearers of the right to elect (droit d’élire). It was 
thus highly probable that proportional representation would increase the 
degree of Unmittelbarkeit (direct link) between individual voters and 
government.120 Thanks to proportional representation, the definition of 
these subgroups was not a matter of ‘unnatural’ territorial criteria, but of 
an affiliation between persons agreeing on the same political ideas (alle 
Personen der gleichen politischen Überzeugung).121
Carré de Malberg focused excessively on an extreme case 
(‘ideeller Grenzfall’), whereby the representative system as such would 
be destroyed. Kelsen fully adhered to Errera’s distinction between the 
operation of the majority rule for decisions made in parliament, on the 
one hand, and every citizen’s right to be represented, on the other hand. 
Proportional representation was a consequence of the ‘individualistische 
Prinzip der Freiheit’. All minorities in society, by their mere existence, 
exert an influence on political decisions. The narrower a political majority 
becomes, the more it will be inclined to build its decisions on compromise. 
As a consequence, proportional representation ensures the majority 
will not abuse of its power, to let ‘die Wille der Mehrheit schrankenlos 
118 The number of preference votes expressed could result in the attribution of remaining 
seats to candidates on the largest list. Esmein and Nézard (1921), 317.
119 Carré de Malberg (1922), II, 480. For Carré, the ‘droit de vote’ ought to be distinguished 
from the ‘droit d’élire’, which only belonged to the corpus of active citizens, the only 
‘organe electoral de l’Etat’. Ibid II, 481.
120 Kelsen (1925) 349.
121 Ibid, 348.
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 86, p. 28-62, dez. 2020 53
Frederik Dhondt
über den der Minderheiten herrschen’.122 Minorities could not prevent 
the majority from acting according to its wishes, but proportional 
representation offered them the possibility to come ‘unwesentlich näher’ 
(almost unimaginably close) to a culture of compromise and pacification. 
4.3 France 1925-1927: the triumph of majoritarian orthodoxy
After the return to the majority system, Léon Duguit, who had 
defended ‘PR’ before World War One, showed himself very critical of 
proportional representation. In his course on public law professed at the 
University of Cairo in 1926, he doubted whether the concept would be 
compatible with national sovereignty at all, and stated that Belgium had 
‘no majority left whatsoever’.123 This a reference to the severe financial 
tensions during the 1925-1926 government of Socialists and Catholics, 
which was brought down by speculation.124 However, one could also 
use the opposite argument, as Jaurès did during the 1912 debate, at the 
apex of the ‘mouvement proportionnaliste’ of 1906-1913: the majority 
system in France had not assured stable majorities.125 Duguit’s rejection 
in 1926 is rather surprising. Three years earlier, the 1923 edition of his 
Traité de droit constitutionnel, echoed Carré de Malberg’s preference 
for the term proportional ‘election’. However, Duguit added that 
proportional ‘representation’ in itself was an ill-conceived term, since a 
proportional distribution of seats did not necessarily entail a new theory 
of representation or of national sovereignty. One could infer that Duguit 
did not consider PR incompatible with the republican idea of national 
sovereignty.126
122 Ibid, 349. See also Baumert (2013), 11-12.
123 ‘Pour ma part j’ai été un fervent du système proportionnel. On se demande, et je me 
demande aujourd’hui si, à côté d’avantages évidents, il n’a pas de graves inconvénients, 
s’il n’aboutit pas, comme en Belgique, à la suppression dans les assemblées politiques 
d’une majorité de gouvernement, indispensable pour que la machine parlementaire 
puisse fonctionner.’ Duguit (1926), 230.
124 Matheve (2016), 271–272.
125 ‘Majorities can crumble with any system, causing any Government to seek support 
from various groups or parties’. Orban (1911) I, 130.
126 Duguit (1923), III, 571.
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One year after Duguit’s Cairo lectures, the Chambre des Députés 
opted to scrap proportional representation with the law of 21 July 1927, 
with y a very thin majority (295 against 265).127 The return to the majority 
system was defended in an ulterior debate by Thomson. He stated in the 
Chambre des Députés that the majority system had been conformable to 
the ‘génie même de notre regime politique et parlementaire’128, ever since 
the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848.129 Yet, the association of 
proportional representation and justice did not disappear with the wiping 
out of the system in 1925, as its multiple resurrections indicate.130 The 
republican Blaisot (1881-1945) argued that the ‘justice électorale’ was 
still an ideal cherished by the majority of his compatriots.131
5 Conclusion
From 1883 to 1921, the Belgian electoral system underwent 
systemic changes, designed to adapt representative institutions to the 
advent of universal suffrage and end the disenfranchisement of at least 
the male half of the adult population. An elitist well-off group of at most 
100 000 electors could no longer embody the collective national will. 
The parallel development of arguments on proportional representation 
in France, within the broader international ‘élan proportionnaliste’ of 
the later 19th century,132 is striking. Parisian defenders of the republican 
regime staunchly opposed the introduction of this reform up to the 
Great War, whereas Belgian conservatives bowed fourteen year earlier, 
admitting PR, however without introducing the one man one vote-
principle, and without corrections in district size. 
127 Erhard & Passard (2019), 14-17.
128 J.O. D.P. CdD 5 July 1927, col. 2288.
129 This refers back to the Third Republic’s interpretation of Universal Sufrage after the 
fall of the Second Empire, see on this subject Prelot (2013).
130 Le Beguec (1986), passim.
131 J.O. D.P. CdD 2 June 1911, col. 2298. 
132 Rosanvallon (2010), 156.
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 86, p. 28-62, dez. 2020 55
Frederik Dhondt
Proportional representation was defended across borders by 
activists and legal scholars using the tautological moral slogan of ‘justice 
and equality’. Yet, ‘equality’ in electoral affairs did not necessarily imply 
the one man-one vote principle (in the Belgian case), nor a right of 
mimetic representation (in the French case). Proponents and opponents 
of PR could conceive of alternative definitions of justifiable differences 
in treatment. For Carré de Malberg, equality in voting was restricted to 
‘l’aptitude au vote’, and not applicable to the consequences of a vote 
cast, ‘ceux-ci peuvant demeurer négatifs pour les électeurs qui forment la 
minorité’.133 
Before the Great War, caught between conservative Germany, where 
the 1871 constitution still consecrated monarchical sovereignty134 and 
progressive, secular France, where left-wing and republican governments 
were feared as a factor of political instability in Europe, Belgium steered 
a middle course with experiments in its electoral ‘laboratory’. Yet, due 
to the transnational constitutional and democratic reverberations of the 
Great War, the characteristic of ‘justice’135 attached to PR would truly 
emerge, to transform the country profoundly. 
In the long run, proportional representation had massive 
consequences for the operation of the Belgian political system. The 
country’s culture of pacification gradually required the representation 
of all minorities, across the linguistic divide. Tensions between regions 
and linguistic communities are resolved in federalism (1970), tensions 
between employers and employees gave rise to a complex system of 
corporatist social negotiations (1919), tensions between Catholics and 
non-Catholics resulted in important pacts on schools (1959) and cultural 
life (1973).136 The increasing devolution of competences (1970, 1980, 
1988, 1993, 2001, 2012) has entrenched PR-pacification mechanisms 
133 Carré de Malberg (1922), II, 481. 
134 In 1923, Duguit stated that the patrimonial idea of the state had ended in 1919. Yet, he 
still distinguished the German conception of a state based on Herrschaft and corporation 
(Jellinek), from the French idea of the nation as carrier of state sovereignty, exercised 
through representatives. Duguit (1923), 460. 
135 I borrow these expressions from political scientist Vedel (1978), 246.
136 Witte, Meynen and Luyten (2017).
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within each constituent entity of the Belgian state. In that sense, the 
introduction of PR in 1899 was the most fundamental reform of the 
Belgian political system, the consequences of which reached further than 
its initiators could have imagined.
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